Docket is pre-1.0. Security fixes land on main and in the next tagged release; there
are no long-term support branches yet. If you are self-hosting, run a recent tag.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main / latest release |
✅ |
| Older tags | ❌ — upgrade |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.
Report it privately, either way:
- Preferred: GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — Security → Report a vulnerability
- Email: bhadanirohit1@gmail.com
Helpful to include: affected version or commit, deployment shape (bundled Postgres vs external, storage driver), reproduction steps or a proof of concept, and what an attacker gets out of it.
- Acknowledgement within 5 business days.
- An assessment and a rough fix timeline after triage.
- Credit in the release notes and advisory, unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
This is a small volunteer-maintained project — there is no bug bounty. Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before disclosing publicly.
In scope: anything in this repository — the Next.js app, the worker, the public API, auth flows (agent sessions, customer ticket tokens, API keys), the Docker images and Compose files published from here.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies with no exploitable path through Docket — report those upstream (Dependabot already watches our lockfile).
- Findings that require an already-compromised host, database, or admin account.
- Misconfiguration of your own deployment: a weak or default
APP_SECRET, a publicly exposed Postgres port, running without TLS, a world-readable.env. - Missing hardening headers or rate limits with no demonstrated impact.
- Reports generated wholesale by an automated scanner with no verified exploit path.
A few things are your responsibility, not the application's, and are worth checking before you go live:
APP_SECRETmust be 32+ genuinely random characters, unique per deployment. It signs sessions and customer ticket tokens — a guessable one is game over.- Terminate TLS in front of the app (Nginx, Caddy, Traefik, or your platform's proxy).
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URLshould be thehttps://URL. - Never expose the Postgres port publicly. The bundled Compose service isn't published to the host, and it should stay that way.
- API keys are shown once and stored hashed. Rotate them at
/admin/api-keysif one leaks; there's no way to recover a lost one. - Customer portal links are bearer tokens in a URL. They're scoped to a single ticket, but treat them like credentials — the same way any "magic link" product works.